To see the context for this and other questions in this series, please see the introduction, parts 1, 2, 3, and 4.
What Are Satisfaction and Penal Substitution Theories Doing in the Book of Mormon?
Portions of this post are excerpted from my Dialogue article cited later in the post, which focuses more on inconsistencies in LDS cosmology.
The Atonement in the New Testament
The Gospels have very little to say about how
the Atonement works. Essentially, Jesus stated that he came to “give his life a
ransom for many” (Matt. 20:28), that his blood would be “shed for many for the
remission of sins” (Matt. 26:28), that he would voluntarily lay down his life
(John 10:17), and that he would fulfill “all things . . . which were written in
the law of Moses and in the prophets” (Luke 24:44). But any explanation of the
mechanics of the Atonement, how exactly his suffering and death were to
accomplish these things, is missing from the Gospels.
Peter and Paul attempted to interpret Jesus’s
vicarious sacrifice, but their attempts were limited. In Romans 3:23–25, for
example, Paul writes, “For all have sinned, and come short of the glory of God;
being justified freely by his grace through the redemption that is in Christ Jesus;
whom God hath set forth to be a propitiation [pacification or appeasement]
through faith in his blood, to declare his righteousness for the remission of
sins that are past, through the forbearance of God.” This suggests Christ
pacifies the wrath of God against our sins through his own righteousness and suffering.
In 2 Corinthians 5:21, Paul says, “For he
[God] hath made him [Jesus] to be sin for us, who knew no sin; that we might be
made the righteousness of God in him.” This suggests that Jesus took upon
himself our sins, a substitution, as it were, and thereby makes us righteous.
In 1 Peter 2:21–24, Peter declares, “Christ
also suffered for us, leaving us an example, that ye should follow his steps;
who did no sin, neither was guile found in his mouth; who, when he was reviled,
reviled not again; when he suffered he threatened not; but committed himself to
him that judgeth righteously; who his own self bare our sins in his own body on
the tree, that we, being dead to sins, should live unto righteousness; by whose
stripes ye were healed.” This indicates again that Christ, being sinless, was
able to suffer for our sins on the cross.
In 1 Peter 3:18, Peter writes, “For Christ also hath once suffered for sins, the just for the unjust, that he might bring us to God, being put to death in the flesh, but quickened by the Spirit.” Again, Jesus, being sinless, suffered for us sinners.
A Brief History of Atonement Theology
This is about as far as the New Testament
goes in explaining the Atonement. Consequently, the Early Church Fathers felt a
need to develop theories to explain the mechanics and a systematic doctrine of
the Atonement. For a couple of centuries, the moral influence theory prevailed.
Its teachers “suggested that Christ’s ability to save mankind . . . came
chiefly through his ability to inspire moral change.”1
The next theory, which overlapped with the
moral influence theory and endured until Middle Ages, was ransom theory. Since
humanity came into this world of sin in a fallen state, we are in bondage to the
devil. As explained by R. W. Southern, “God became Man, and the Devil failed to
realize it. He failed to see the Divinity beneath the human form. He claimed Him
as his own and subjected Him to Death. But in doing this he committed that
great act of lawlessness—that extension of his authority over One who had made
no diffidatio, no surrender of Himself to the Devil—and this lost him
his empire.”2 In this way, Christ became a ransom for sinful
humanity and freed us from bondage to the devil.
Ransom theory prevailed until Anselm, a monk
and bishop at Canterbury, proposed a new interpretation of the Atonement in the
11th century. Precursors to Anselm can be found in the writings of church
fathers in both the eastern and western tradition, but while they emphasized the
conflict between God and Satan that lay at the heart of ransom theory, “some of
these authors—most notably Athanasius and Augustine—emphasized the justice of
God’s actions in this conflict. Concern about the place of justice in the Atonement
grew over the centuries, though most theologians continued to adhere to the basic
tenets of ransom theory.”3 Anselm’s innovation dispensed with the idea
that the devil had any claim on humankind. Instead, he “emphasized the need for
humanity to make satisfaction for sin, which Anselm viewed as an affront to the
honor of God.”4 But since it was impossible for men or women to make
this satisfaction, God became man, and Jesus Christ offered that satisfaction
for all of sinful humanity. Anselm’s theory fits comfortably within the medieval
feudalistic understanding of authority and of reparation.
Anselm’s theory of atonement, known as satisfaction theory, prevailed until the Reformation, when the idea of justice became prominent. The Reformers “adjusted Anselm’s view in one important way to produce what scholars have called ‘penal’ or ‘substitution theory.’”5 Most prominent in this development was John Calvin, who put atonement theory in terms of criminal law, since he was trained as a lawyer. “The sin of mankind, the Reformers contended, was not an affront to God’s honor—as for a feudal lord betrayed by his vassal—but, rather, a breaking of his moral code. Hence, God required punishment for wrongdoing rather than satisfaction for slighted honor. Christ took this punishment upon himself; as a sinless man, he paid the penalty for the guilty. . . . Penal theory has remained the standard interpretation of Christ’s Atonement throughout the Christian world to the present.”6 This is also the theory that prevails in Mormonism, largely because it appears prominently in the Book of Mormon.
Punishment—a Violent Universe
Let me digress for
a moment, though. For my purposes here, an important question is whether the
moral law requires a punishment if it is violated. Lehi, in the Book of Mormon,
answers in the affirmative (2 Ne. 2:10). So does Amulek (Alma 34:14–16). But
does this make sense? Doctrine and Covenants section 19 suggests that sin (the conscious
violation of moral law) requires an excruciating physical and spiritual
punishment—in other words, violence (vv. 16–18). But why?
In my Dialogue
article “Getting the Cosmology Right,”7 I explore the question of
where the moral law originated. Did God simply think it up? This view is often
called divine command theory, and it is problematic for reasons too involved to
go into here (see my article for a more thorough discussion). The other option for
Mormons is that the moral law existed before God became God, and he is bound by
such moral principles as justice and mercy. This second view is the one
presented, for the most part, in the Book of Mormon. But if no one created the
moral law, does the law itself require violence if it is violated? Apparently,
the scriptural answer is yes. And this is a significant reason behind the proclaimed
need for an infinite atonement. God must be just, so a punishment is necessary,
but God must also be merciful, hence the need for a Savior to suffer vicariously
for us. But why is such a drastic measure required apparently indiscriminately,
regardless of the severity of the infraction? (see D&C 19).
In this life, we
have myriad examples of how people can reform and improve and become more
perfect without horrific punishment and without even the threat of violence. If
someone steals from me, feels remorse, and returns the stolen item, I do not
need to require that person to be beaten with a cudgel as a payment for the misdeed.
Neither do I need someone like Jesus to be beaten with a cudgel for that
person’s wrong. And the person does not need to be beaten to motivate him to
not steal again. I can simply forgive the person and encourage him to live a
moral life. And if he does, end of story, at least as far as I’m concerned. For
reform and improvement to take place, there is often no actual need for a
severe punishment, inflicted either directly or vicariously. This being true, why
would an eternal moral law demand violence for every sin? This I find hard to understand.
But if instead it is God who demands the punishment, the violence, rather than
the law itself, we must still ask why. What reason would he have for exacting a
painful punishment even when the sinner experiences remorse and desires to
reform? Why must the sinner, or his vicarious substitute, experience a painful punishment
for performing an immoral act (see D&C 19:16)? What would be the purpose of
such violence?
We read in the
Book of Mormon that God has to be just. If he is not just, he is not God (Alma
42:13, 15, 22, 25). Note that God’s need to be just is not dependent on his own
arbitrary declaration that justice is a moral attribute. No, justice appears to
be an independent standard that God must adhere to, otherwise he ceases to be
God. He becomes something else if he is not just. Mercy is a similar attribute.
“God himself atoneth for the sins of the world, to bring about the plan of
mercy, to appease the demands of justice, that God might be a perfect, just
God, and a merciful God also” (Alma 42:15). But does being just involve always
meting out a horrible punishment for every sin, either to the sinner or to some
innocent substitute? Alma insists this is so: “Repentance could not come unto
men except there were a punishment” (Alma 42:16). Why is it impossible to
repent without a punishment? What sort of eternal law requires this?
Another problem
with the notion of severe and painful punishment for every sin is that there
are endless gradations of sin. And the idea that a person who tells a white lie
that harms no one deserves the same awful punishment as a serial rapist simply
does not make sense. In our mortal legal codes, we recognize the need for the
punishment to fit the crime, and also for the punishment to vary—or even be
expunged—according to all sorts of extenuating circumstances. Indeed, for some
minor infractions of the law, particularly when much time has passed and the
violator has since lived a law-abiding life, no punishment is exacted. That
eternal law would not do likewise is unthinkable to me. But section 19 of the
Doctrine and Covenants presents just such a scenario.
Martin Harris did
not murder anyone. He did not rape anyone. He did not steal the 116 manuscript
pages and sell them to Joseph’s enemies. He just wanted to show them to his
wife and a few family members. Maybe he was careless. Maybe he thought he knew
better than God what was permissible. Maybe he was proud. But maybe he just
wanted to preserve peace with his wife, who was struggling with Martin’s
devotion to Joseph’s story. Maybe he wanted validation, so he showed the pages
to a handful of people who weren’t supposed to see them. The pages were stolen
from him. And for this, he was threatened with the same excruciating pain that
Jesus experienced in Gethsemane and on the cross, unless he repented. If this
revelation is a recitation of the Lord’s words and not a text influenced by
Joseph’s own guilt and his frustration with Martin, it indicates that each of
us will be subject to that same punishment for any and all sins we do not
repent of. Is this the sort of cosmos we inhabit? One that demands excruciating
pain for every single sin, no matter how severe? Why? And the only way we can
avoid this pain is for someone else to suffer it for us? Again, what sort of
universe would require such an arrangement? Who divined this intent in the
eternal moral law? This argument relies, of course, upon a certain theory of atonement,
the penal substitution theory. Because the Book of Mormon preaches this theory,
we must acknowledge that LDS doctrine teaches excruciating punishment for sins,
unless the sinner repents. But even then, Jesus had to endure this punishment
in our stead.
Some might argue that without the threat of a punishment, there is no incentive to change or reform or improve. I do not accept this argument, not in all cases, perhaps not even in most. Many people have shown that they will improve and change simply because they want to become better people. There is in many people an attraction to moral behavior and a revulsion regarding what we define as immoral behavior. Indeed, when we encounter a completely amoral person, we are troubled. We assume something fundamental is wrong with that person. Much of this may be attributed to culture and education, but where did this compulsion for moral education come from? Certainly not from the threat of violence. Many people are also motivated to improve because of the love of others. Indeed, love often seems a far better motivator than fear. So, this is one problem I see with the LDS doctrine of sin and the law. There are others, but this post is too long already.
The LDS Concept of Atonement
The LDS concept
of atonement comes largely from the Book of Mormon, but this presents some
unique problems, partially because atonement theology in the Book of Mormon is
somewhat inconsistent. Historian Matthew Bowman made the following observation:
“The atonement theory of the Book of Mormon is . . . complicated; it frequently
describes the atonement in terms of ransom theory (2 Nephi 2:27; [2] Nephi
9:10), for example, and contains verses consistent with a subjective, moral
influence theory (Alma 7:11). The most extended Book of Mormon discussions of
the atonement, however, describe it in legalistic terminology, meeting the
inexorable demands of natural law. See Alma 34 and 42.”8
If you look at
the verses Bowman references for ransom and moral influence theories, however,
the evidence is not very strong. For instance, 2 Nephi 2:27 does speak of “the
captivity and power of the devil” and of “the great Mediator,” but there is no
mention of a ransom being paid, although if there were a ransom, we must assume
it would be paid to the devil, since he apparently holds us captive in some
way. The preceding verse speaks of people being “redeemed from the fall” and
becoming “free forever, knowing good from evil,” but again, there is no mention
of a ransom. Likewise, 2 Nephi 9:10, which Bowman misidentifies as 1 Nephi
9:10, speaks of God preparing “a way for our escape from the grasp of this
awful monster; yea, that monster, death and hell.” And the preceding verse
speaks of our spirits becoming “angels to a devil” without the Atonement. But
there is no mention of our deliverance being made possible by God or of Christ
paying a ransom to the devil for our release. The means by which we gain
freedom from death and hell is not specified. Much can be read into these
verses and others, but the Book of Mormon in general does not speak of the Atonement
as a ransom.
Bowman’s single
reference to the Book of Mormon’s support for the moral influence theory of atonement
is even less convincing. Alma 7:11 states, “And he shall go forth, suffering
pains and afflictions of every kind; and this that the word might be fulfilled
which saith he will take upon him the pains and the sicknesses of his people.”
In the next verse, Alma declares that Christ “will take upon him their
infirmities, that his bowels may be filled with mercy, according to the flesh,
that he may know how to succor his people according to their infirmities.”
According to BYU professor John Young, proponents of moral influence theory
“suggested that Christ’s ability to save mankind, to make them one with God,
came chiefly through his ability to inspire moral change. . . . Through
emulation, humans achieve a moral character pure enough to warrant inclusion in
heaven.”9 Alma 7:11 and the verses preceding and following it do not
speak in these terms. Alma is claiming instead that Christ somehow took upon
him our infirmities, our pains and sicknesses, so that he can know how to
succor us. Nowhere in this chapter does Alma claim that Jesus saves us by the
example of his moral character.
Others,
particularly Eugene England, Blake Ostler, and Terryl Givens, have expounded
theories of atonement based on Book of Mormon teachings that strip it of its
more legalistic aspects, but if we look carefully at the two chapters that
specifically address atonement theology, Alma 34 and 42 (both mentioned by
Bowman), we must acknowledge that the Book of Mormon’s position on the Atonement
is predominantly in harmony with satisfaction theory and, especially, penal
substitution theory, which has been strongly proclaimed by such modern-day
Apostles as Boyd K. Packer.10
Amulek, in his
sermon recorded in Alma 34, speaks of a “great and last sacrifice” that must be
made and that must be “infinite and eternal” (v. 10). This harks back to the
notion that sin requires a violent punishment to be erased. Amulek relies
strongly on the idea that there is a law that requires some sort of
satisfaction. “The law requireth the life of him who hath murdered; therefore
there can be nothing which is short of an infinite atonement which will suffice
for the sins of the world” (v. 12). He also emphasizes Jesus’s ability to
“satisfy the demands of justice” (v. 16). Christ stands “betwixt [the children
of men] and justice; . . . having redeemed them, and satisfied the demands of
justice” (Mosiah 15:9). An earlier prophet, Jacob, also teaches that “the
atonement satisfieth the demands of his justice upon all those who have not the
law given to them” (2 Ne. 9:26).
The law is
crucially important in the Book of Mormon―in Lehi’s teachings to Jacob (2 Ne.
2:5, 7, 13, 26), in Jacob’s words to the people of Nephi (2 Ne. 9: 25–27), in
King Benjamin’s great sermon at the temple (Mosiah 2:33), and especially in
Alma’s masterful discourse to his son Corianton (Alma 42). Alma is answering
his son’s question regarding “the justice of God in punishing the sinner” (v.
1). Justice, of course, has everything to do with the law, and “all mankind
were fallen, and they were in the grasp of justice” (v. 14). The redemption of
humankind could be effected only through “the plan of mercy . . . ; therefore
God himself atoneth for the sins of the world, to bring about the plan of
mercy, to appease the demands of justice, that God might be a perfect, just
God, and a merciful God also” (v. 15). Alma emphasizes the necessity of
repentance and of punishment for breaking the law. “Now, repentance could not
come unto men except there were a punishment, which also was eternal as the
life of the soul should be” (v. 16). Alma then asks what he considers a logical
sequence of questions. “Now, how could a man repent except he should sin? How
could he sin if there was no law? How could there be a law save there was a
punishment?” (v. 17). He then attempts to explain to Corianton the necessity of
the law. “If there was no law given against sin men would not be afraid to sin.
. . . But there is a law given, and a punishment affixed, and a repentance
granted; which repentance mercy claimeth; otherwise justice claimeth the
creature and executeth the law, and the law inflicteth the punishment; if not
so, the works of justice would be destroyed, and God would cease to be God”
(vv. 20, 22).
Alma seems to
hold two contradictory ideas regarding the cosmology behind the law. He speaks
as if God has given the law to us and established a punishment for violating
it. But he also speaks as if God is bound by a higher moral law. He must be
both just and merciful. These appear to be moral concepts that God did not
invent but that he must obey in order to be God. Perhaps God abides by an
eternal moral law that governs his ability to be considered deity. Based on
this moral law, he then gives us various moral laws that we must follow. If we
don’t, we will be punished, or else we must find a substitute to suffer for us.
The punishment is fixed and eternal, and someone must pay the penalty. The law
must be satisfied. So, either the sinners themselves or some acceptable
substitute must suffer. Because the moral law requires God to be merciful, he
suffers the penalty himself, in the person of Jesus, “to appease the demands of
justice” (v. 15). “What,” Alma asks Corianton, “do ye suppose that mercy can
rob justice? I say unto you, Nay; not one whit. If so, God would cease to be
God” (v. 25)
This assumption about God’s relationship to a higher moral law is consistent with Joseph Smith’s later teachings, but it also raises questions about the nature of the eternity we inhabit. And what if God were to cease being merciful or just? Would he be punished? By whom or what? What sort of violent punishment would he face? And who established this requirement?
Conclusion
This post has been
rather long and convoluted, but the relevant question for this series is simply,
what are satisfaction and penal substitution theories, which originated
centuries after Alma and Amulek taught them, doing in the Book of Mormon? These
atonement theories have flaws, some of which I have pointed out. Other writers
have explored different problems with these theories that I will not examine
here. What is apparent is that the theology in the Book of Mormon is often
anachronistic, fitting far better, as Royal Skousen has argued, in the 16th and
17th centuries than in ancient America. But what should we think also about the
whole notion behind penal substitution, the idea that a moral law that apparently
predates God’s exaltation and that he must follow requires a violent punishment
for every sin? This is the doctrine that both the Book of Mormon and modern revelation
give us.
___________________
2. R. W. Southern, The
Making of the Middle Ages (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1953), 235.
3. Young, “Long Narratives,” 322.
4. Young, “Long Narratives,”
322.
5. Young, “Long Narratives,”
323.
6. Young, “Long Narratives,”
323–24.
7. Roger Terry, “Getting the
Cosmology Right,” Dialogue: A Journal of Mormon Thought 54, no. 4 (2021):
71–98.
8. Matthew
Bowman, “The Crisis of Mormon Christology: History, Progress, and
Protestantism, 1880–1930,” Fides et
Historia 40, no. 2 (2008): 4 n. 10.
9. Young, “Long Narratives,”
319.
10. Boyd K. Packer, “The
Mediator,” Ensign 7, no. 5 (May
1977): 54–56.
